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A REPLY TO CRITICS OF
IN DEFENSE OF KANT’S RELIGION1
Nathan A. Jacobs

In this essay, I reply to the above four critics of In Defense of Kant’s Religion
(IDKR). In reply to George di Giovanni, I highlight the interpretive differences that divide the authors of IDKR and di Giovanni, and argue that di
Giovanni’s atheist reading of Kant does not follow, even granting his premises. In reply to Pamela Sue Anderson, I show that if her reading of Kant is
accurate, Kant’s own talk of God becomes empty and contemptible by his
own lights, and I then show how her empirical bias prompts a significant
misreading of IDKR. In reply to Stephen Palmquist, I expose four fallacious
maneuvers in his paper, which comprise the bulk of his essay. And in reply to
Michalson, I address a series of minor concerns raised in his essay, and then
set the record straight on the motives behind IDKR in general and my own
take on Kant’s compatibility (or lack thereof) with Christianity in specific.

1. Reply to George di Giovanni
I begin my reply to di Giovanni with two points of agreement. First, di
Giovanni asserts that Kant’s argument is coherent. Kant is wrong, but
coherently wrong (164). One way of putting the task of IDKR is that it
argues the validity of Kant’s argument; it leaves unanswered whether
his argument is sound. I will discuss my take on Kant toward the close
of this essay, but for now suffice it to say that I agree with di Giovanni. I
take Kant’s argument to be valid, not sound. This is noteworthy because,
as Part 1 of IDKR makes plain, there are many scholars who take the
validity of Kant’s argument to be suspect. Nicholas Wolterstorff, Philip
Quinn, and Gordon Michalson level serious charges against the coherence of Religion within the Bounds of Mere Reason (IDKR, 46–57; and chap.
3). No doubt di Giovanni and the authors of IDKR disagree about what
Kant is saying, but to grant that Kant is coherently wrong is no small
point of agreement.
My thanks to the Society of Christian Philosophers and Faith and Philosophy for deeming
In Defense of Kant’s Religion (henceforth IDKR) worthy of both an authors-meet-critics session at the American Academy of Religion and a symposium journal issue. In particular, I
would like to thank Jamie Smith and Andrew Chignell for organizing the initial panel, and
thank Chignell and Tom Flint for seeing this collection of essays through to publication. I
would also like to extend my thanks to the critics of IDKR for their willingness to engage
this work. I take their criticisms to be a great compliment.
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The second point of agreement comes in the opening of di Giovanni’s
comment. He writes, “I am pessimistic about the possibility of initiating
a genuine dialogue. My understanding of Kant’s critique of reason and
the historical context in which I place that critique, are simply too far removed from theirs” (163). I commend di Giovanni’s honesty and echo his
sentiment. The divide between di Giovanni and the authors of IDKR goes
well beyond Religion, so much so that to dialogue about the interpretive
specifics of Religion runs the risk of our speaking past one another. But, as
di Giovanni says, one can at least try.
The most basic divide between di Giovanni and the authors of IDKR
concerns where Kant marks the limits of rationality. Di Giovanni identifies himself as a “Christian atheist” (165), and his paper leaves the impression that he would say the same (or something similar) about Kant. If I
understand di Giovanni correctly, he takes Kant’s critique of reason to
land us at knowledge of the empirically known, while reason’s transcendental self-examination produces “rational myths” (167). In other words,
given the needs of reason, it invents chimeras to address its own instabilities; yet these myths are empty concepts that are “practical” only in the
sense that they serve a stabilizing function. The transcendental boundary
line is not, then, an epistemic line but an ontic one, dividing that which
is (the empirically known) from that which is not (that for which there
is no possible intuition). The implication is that God, freedom, immortality, and the soul are non-entities invented by reason to address its
own impotence.
Such a take on Kant’s philosophy stands in stark contrast to that of the
authors of IDKR. We take the transcendental boundary line to divide the
empirically knowable from the empirically unknowable. But we do not
presume that empirical unknowability indicates non-existence. Rather,
the limits of empirical knowledge press reason into practical, aesthetic,
and teleological considerations, and these considerations commend God,
freedom, immortality and the soul, neither as objects of knowledge nor as
myths, but as rational beliefs (IDKR, 112).
The divide between di Giovanni’s understanding of Kant and ours is
significant. Yet, this divide goes well beyond IDKR; it represents a divide
between two camps of Kant interpretation. The case is made in Kant and
the New Philosophy of Religion that there are two interpretive trends in Kant
studies, which the editors dub “traditional interpretations” and “affirmative interpretations.” Interpretations designated “traditional” are negative
toward the prospects of grounding religion and theology in the Kantian
paradigm, while interpreters designated “affirmative” believe a proper
reading of Kant offers some form of theological affirmation.2 Di Giovanni
is a traditional interpreter, while the authors of IDKR are affirmative
2
See Chris L. Firestone and Stephen R. Palmquist, “Editors’ Introduction,” in Kant and
the New Philosophy of Religion, ed. Firestone and Palmquist (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2006).
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interpreters. Acknowledging this divide, I will highlight three flaws that
I see in di Giovanni’s approach to Kant.
Assuming di Giovanni would label Kant an atheist, the first difficulty
this label creates is that it ignores Kant’s insistence that his strictures on
knowledge cut two ways, silencing both the dogmatist and the skeptic
(A388–389).3 As a theologian, I am often reminded of the implications for
my discipline, so allow me to return the favor. Under Kant’s strictures,
atheism is a form of dogmatism. It asserts a knowledge claim (albeit a negative one) regarding God that violates Kant’s limits on human knowledge.4
Since we are here focused on Kant’s Religion, I will cite Book 4 on this
point. There Kant identifies the position of the naturalist as out of bounds
for the rationalist: “Hence [the rationalist] will never deny in the manner
of a naturalist . . . the intrinsic possibility of revelation” (6:155). Were Kant
a naturalist (as opposed to a rationalist) and thus certain that God does
not exist, rejecting the possibility of revelation would not only be rational
but necessary. For there would exist no being worthy of the name God
that may reveal himself. Yet, it is Kant’s epistemic strictures that stave off
dogmatic atheism and demand that the door remain ever-open to the possibility that God exists and may reveal himself.5
For the purposes of Kant interpretation, Kant’s insistence on our epistemic limits is essential, since the limits of knowledge serve a positive
function: they force us to seek non-empirical grounds by which we may
consider questions of God, freedom, and immortality. When reason commends belief in God, it does not do so in the manner of the theological
non-realist who is certain that such talk is useful but empty.6 Reason commends belief as rational because it cannot discount the possibility that
these concepts, commended by reason’s transcendental self-examination,
may be rooted in reality.
This brings me to a second feature of di Giovanni’s comment, which is
susceptible to the charge of begging the question. Di Giovanni’s presentation presumes that if a reading of Kant is theologically or metaphysically
robust, then it is wrong. Di Giovanni is certainly within his intellectual
rights to presume such a reading of Kant. However, to presume this reading and its entailments in the current context begs the question at hand,
3
Throughout this essay, citations of Kant’s writings are embedded in the body of the
essay and refer to the German Akademie pagination. English quotations are based on the
Cambridge University Press translations of Kant’s works.
4
I develop this line of argument in “Kant’s Apologia: A Look at the Usefulness of Kantian
Insights for Christian Thought,” Philosophia Christi 9:1 (2007).
5
See Chris L. Firestone, “The Illegitimate Son: Kant and Theological Non-Realism,” in
The Persistence of the Sacred in Modern Thought, ed. Chris L. Firestone and Nathan A. Jacobs
(Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2012), chap. 10.
6
E.g., Don Cupitt, Nothing Sacred? The Non-Realist Philosophy of Religion (New York: Fordham University Press, 2002); Don Cupitt, “God and the World in Post-Kantian Thought,”
Theology 75 (1972); Don Cupitt, The Nature of Man (London: Sheldon Press, 1979); and Don
Cupitt, “Kant and the Negative Theology,” in The Philosophical Frontiers of Christian Theology,
ed. B. Hebblethwaite and S. Sutherland (Cambridge University Press, 1982).
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namely, whether Kant’s rational religion is in fact metaphysically robust.
The authors of IDKR maintain that the matter must be adjudicated by
Kant’s texts, and the textual finding of IDKR is that Religion is a metaphysically and theologically robust text.
I will highlight one example from Book 4. In 6:153–155, Kant identifies various positions on revelation. In IDKR, we give both textual and
contextual reason to think that Kant’s assessment of the matter is as follows. Concerning revelation, one may reject its very possibility and be a
naturalist or accept its possibility and be a rationalist. The question facing
the rationalist is whether revelation is a possible but unnecessary hastening influence on reason or is a catalyst necessary to awaken reason. The
former position is that of the pure rationalist; the latter is that of the supernaturalist rationalist. These positions correspond to those identified by
G. E. Lessing in §§4 and 77 of The Education of the Human Race,7 and their
influence is noted by historians, such as August Dorner and Emmanuel
Hirsch (IDKR, 211–220).8 The fact that Kant narrows his discussion to
these two positions is significant. For though he does not solve the debate,
he does place himself within a discussion of philosophical theology very
unlike what would be expected from the traditional Kant.
The third point is this. Even if we grant di Giovanni’s reading of Kant,
the atheist conclusion does not follow. For the inference moves from a de
jure criticism (concerning how the belief emerges) to a de facto conclusion
(concerning the truth or falsehood of the belief). The inference is a genetic
(or, given the turn to the subject, psychogenetic) fallacy.
Alvin Plantinga makes a similar point in reference to Sigmund Freud’s
charge that religious belief is the product of wish fulfillment. Plantinga
points out that Freud’s claim is a de jure criticism. Building on his own
work concerning warranted belief, Plantinga argues that the question of
whether this de jure criticism yields the de facto implication that religious
belief is false depends on (a) whether Freud’s claim concerning wish fulfillment is true and (b) whether this wish fulfillment constitutes a faculty
aimed at something other than truth.9 Concerning (b), Plantinga points
out that one could argue that when considering which possible means
is most efficient for producing belief in God, God concluded that wish
fulfillment is that most efficient means. If this were the de facto origin
of wish fulfillment, then wish fulfillment would be a faculty aimed at
7
The Education of the Human Race can be found (in German) in Sämtliche Schriften und
Briefe, ed. Der Deutschen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin (Berlin, 1923–), vol. 13,
413–436 and (in English) in Lessing’s Theological Writings, trans. Henry Chadwick (Stanford,
CA: Stanford University Press, 1957).
8
See also I. A. Dorner, History of Protestant Theology, Particularly in Germany, Viewed According to Its Fundamental Movement and Connection with the Religious, Moral, and Intellectual
Life (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1871), vol. 2, bk. 2, div. 2, pt. 3, ch. 1ff.; and Emanuel Hirsch, Geschichte der Neuern Evangelischen Theologie. Im Zusammenhang mit den allgemeinen Bewegungen
des europãischen Denkens (C. Bertelsmann Verlag Gutersloh, 1949), vol. 1, pt. 1, chaps. 47–48.
9
See Alvin Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief (New York: Oxford University Press,
2000), 194–195.
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truth, and the de jure criticism would be no criticism at all. Merely naming
the faculty “wish fulfillment” does not show the falsehood of the beliefs
it generates.
The same reply could be offered to di Giovanni’s Kant. Even if we grant
that God, freedom, etc., are mere inventions of reason to stabilize itself (a
point the authors of IDKR deny), this concession would not demonstrate
the de facto falsehood of such beliefs. It may well be that God has created
reason with all its limits and instabilities precisely because these are the
most efficient conditions for generating concepts of and beliefs in God,
freedom, immortality, and the soul. It may well be that all of these inventions of reason have referents in reality (empirically inaccessible) to which
these beliefs correspond. Simply naming them “rational myths” does not
indicate their falsehood.
I close this reply to di Giovanni with a comment on the passage he
cites from the third Critique (5:402). First, I would note that di Giovanni’s
take on the import of this passage is flawed on logical grounds. In the
passage Kant highlights the failing of the understanding to show any
connection between possibility (concepts) and actuality (intuitions). From
this di Giovanni concludes that modal categories do not apply to things
in themselves (168). But failing to prove q is different from disproving q.
Aside from this quibble, however, I take issue with di Giovanni’s understanding of the subject of the passage. Di Giovanni reads the passage
as a remark on modality and concludes that the understanding’s inability to bridge the gap between possibility and actuality means that Kant
cuts off possibility, accepting only actuality (168). In its broader context,
however, this passage is not about modality. Prior to this remark, Kant
discusses the need of reason to posit an intelligence (God) as the source of
teleology. In the remarks, he goes on to discuss an important distinction
between reason and understanding. The entire discussion of possibility
and actuality is in the context of a problem that understanding (not reason) runs into, given its dealings with the empirical. Understanding deals
in either intuitions, which are present to the senses, or concepts unemployed. The former concerns actual things (things known to have being
because they are present to the senses), while the latter considers only the
internal coherence of objects of thought. When limited to the understanding, we run aground in thinking of anything beyond mere possibility and
mere actuality, and have no basis on which to bridge the two—the point
on which di Giovanni harps. But Kant’s opening distinction between reason and understanding is pivotal and goes to the heart of our distinction in IDKR between pure cognitions of reason and empirical cognitions.
Cognitions of reason are not mere mental pictures. Cognitions of reason
deal in the a priori understanding of God as the ens realissimum for which
there is no possible intuition (A575–78/B603–606, A621/B649, 28:1020;
IDKR, 104–105). Reason is here purged of its tendency to embellish God
with anthropomorphisms, and instead deals in practical, aesthetic, and
teleological considerations that are derived from reason’s transcendental
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self-examination. Understanding has difficulty with such cognitions because it seeks to either force them into the realm of the actual (empirical
intuition) or relegate them to the possible (unemployed concepts). But this
is a problem for the faculty of understanding, not for the faculty of reason.
2. Reply to Pamela Sue Anderson
The distinction between reason and understanding brings me to Anderson’s paper, which proves just as befuddled by pure cognitions of reason
as the faculty of understanding. Anderson cannot find where to place
cognitions of reason, since she is dealing in only empirical intuitions and
concepts unemployed. If God or other rational concepts, such as those
discussed in IDKR, are in mind, Anderson concludes that they must be
an empirical intuition, a concept unemployed, or some via media that
moves from the latter to the former—what she calls “coming to know”
(152, 155). Firestone has given ample attention to Anderson, so I will simply add two points.
The first is this. If we limit Kant’s philosophical inquiries to only concepts and intuitions, then Kant’s own concept of God becomes empty, if
not contemptible by his own lights. To explain, Kant is quite clear that the
a priori understanding of God is different from anthropomorphic ideas of
God, which find their footing in the empirical. As Kant states,
For if in some other, perhaps practical relations, the presupposition of a
highest and all-sufficient being, as supreme intelligence, were to assert its
validity without any objection, then it would be of the greatest importance
to determine this concept precisely on its transcendental side, as the concept
of a necessary and most-real being, to get rid of what is incompatible with
the highest reality, what belongs to mere appearance (anthropomorphism
broadly understood), and at the same time to get out of the way all opposed
assertions, whether they be atheistic, deistic or anthropomorphic; all this
is very easy to do in such a critical treatment, since the same grounds of
considering human reason incapable of asserting the existence of such a
being, when laid before our eyes, also suffice to prove the unsuitability of
all counter-assertions. (A640–641/B668–B669)

Kant is explicit that if the presupposition of a highest and all-sufficient
being (the a priori concept of God) is to assert its validity, then it must be
purged of empirical elements. But we must ask: If Kant cannot have anything
in mind but the empirical, how can any concept survive the disposal of all empirical elements?
The same question emerges in Kant’s articulation of the problem of
divine revelation. According to Kant, the idea of God is such that only an
infinite experience would be adequate to the concept (A621/B649). Yet, because Kant thinks such an experience is impossible, he presumes that any
finite appearance must always be judged to be something other than God.
For no matter how grand the empirical intuition, as finite it is at odds with
the a priori concept of a being having all reality (7:63, 8:142–143, 28:1022,
28:1118). Once again, however, we must ask: If all concepts are empirically
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derived, what is the alternative to anthropomorphic concepts of God? With what
does Kant think we are to compare an empirical appearance?
Kant’s insistence that we purge our concept of God of all empirical
elements implies that a non-anthropomorphic concept of God is possible.
Kant speaks of God and thus has a concept of him. But if all concepts
find their footing in the empirical, as Anderson seems to think, then even
Kant’s concept of God is corrupt by his own standards.
The authors of IDKR, arrive at a different conclusion. We take Kant’s
continual distinction between a priori and anthropomorphic views of God
to indicate that a non-anthropomorphic concept of God is possible. This
brings us once again to the distinction made in IDKR between pure and
empirical cognition. Our claim is simply that, for Kant, not all that one
gets in mind is grounded in empirical intuition. Hence, Kant can get God
in mind without anthropomorphism, and it is this type of pure cognition that is in play when Kant speaks of God as the “being of all beings”
(A578/B606), “a being having all reality” (631/B659), and so on. This a priori
concept is the object of rational belief and is in view amid Kant’s transcendental arguments, including those in Religion (IDKR, 105–119, 155–170,
202–205).
This brings me to my second point concerning how Anderson’s empirical bias prompts a severe misreading of IDKR. Anderson characterizes
the role of pure cognition in IDKR as “meant to stress the process of coming to know” (153). I am not clear on what Anderson has in mind here,
but my impression is that she reads us as beginning with rational concepts and moving toward, or arriving at, an empirical intuition (152–153,
156–157). Hence she argues that our take on transcendental claims seems
un-Kantian because they depend on the “intellectual intuition of a prototype, i.e., Christ as God and man” (160). But the authors of IDKR make
no such claim. The only place in IDKR in which we speak of “coming to
know” is in reference to an article by Rolf George in which he notes that
though erkennen can mean “to come to know,” it can also have a more
general meaning of getting something in mind (IDKR, 110). As we go on
to explain, our use of “pure cognition” (e.g., in reference to the prototype)
refers to the latter use, not to empirical knowledge (IDKR, 110–114). As
noted above in reference to di Giovanni, we do not take the concepts at
which reason arrives by its transcendental self-examination to be mere
chimeras. However, as argued above in reference to Anderson, not all rational concepts are possible objects of experience. Instead, IDKR contends
that the moral disposition and the prototype are pure cognitions (or nonempirical rational concepts) that are gotten in mind and for which there
are critically satisfying moral and religious support for their affirmation
as rational beliefs. They are not, however, known (in the Kantian sense),
nor do we come to know them.
As for Anderson’s charge that “Firestone and Jacobs seem to assume
that pure cognition of what is empirically unknowable is rendered possible by Christ as ‘the prototype’ of the pure moral disposition” (12), this too
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is false. Such a characterization is much closer to Jeffrey Privette who employs Henry Allison’s double-aspect reading and Palmquist’s principle of
perspective to claim that Christ is the empirical side of the transcendent
God.10 This position I wrote against prior to IDKR,11 and IDKR too rejects
it. For example, “The prototype is not a translation of Christian theology
or a symbolic rendition of Jesus of Nazareth” (IDKR, 154, also 117, 155).
IDKR states explicitly that neither the moral disposition nor the prototype is a possible object of experience (IDKR, 142, 158). The prototype,
on our reading, is a concept of reason. We argue that Kant’s prototype is
an archetypal Idea (in the Platonic sense) of morally perfect humanity.
This prototype proceeds from God from eternity, much like the Kabbalist
concept of Adam Kadmon (IDKR, 155–170).12 As for the relationship (or
potential relationship) between the prototype and Jesus, we address this
issue in our treatment of Book 3. There we make clear that, for Kant, it is
possible that Jesus is an appearance of the prototype, but we could never
know this to be so. The prototype is defined by his perfect disposition, and
the disposition is not a possible object of experience. One could believe
that Jesus is the prototype, but Kant would insist that such faith, to remain
rational, be committed first to the prototype of reason and then to Jesus
who is thought to be the prototype. For moral hope resides in the former;
the latter, for Kant, offers hope only if he is indeed the prototype—something of which Kant believes we cannot be certain (IDKR, 203–204).
In the end, Anderson’s empirical bias hinders her from grasping what
is meant by pure cognitions of reason and its role in IDKR’s interpretation
of Religion. The result is a faulty understanding of what is being claimed
about the status of rational beliefs, and about the relationship between
these beliefs and historical faith.
3. Reply to Stephen Palmquist
I have chosen to focus on four significant fallacious maneuvers in
Palmquist’s piece. To my mind, these comprise the bulk of his essay.13
See Jeffrey S. Privette, “Must Theology Re-Kant?,” Heythrop Journal 40 (1999).
See Nathan Jacobs, “Kant’s Prototypical Theology: Transcendental Incarnation as a
Rational Foundation for God-Talk,” in Firestone and Palmquist, Kant and the New Philosophy
of Religion.
12
I gather that one source of Anderson’s confusion is my/our talk of “transcendental
incarnation,” a term Anderson must be reading as the transcendent becoming enfleshed
(see her footnote 24). However, as I explain in my work prior to IDKR, and as we repeat in
IDKR, “transcendental incarnation” does not refer to the prototype becoming empirical
(see Jacobs, “Kant’s Prototypical Theology,” 134; and IDKR, 164). It refers to this supersensible entity uniting himself with our secondary substance, human, thus making his moral
disposition available to us; yet this descent or union is transcendental because it is a nonempirical concept commended by the needs of reason (IDKR, 164).
13
I have catalogued many more fallacious claims in Palmquist’s essay than I have space
to itemize. E.g., under Errors of Fact, I have excluded five less-vital instances: (i) The authors consider no “Axinn-type” affirmative approaches (172). Ad contra: we address the reading
of Adina Davidovich, which fits the affirmative genre of an Axinn-type approach (IDKR,
62–69). (ii) The authors claim that all other interpreters truncate the Religion text (174). Ad con10
11
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3.1 Errors of Fact
The most common feature of Palmquist’s paper is the Error of Fact. The
first of these has already been noted by Firestone and comprises the entirety of Palmquist’s first question, namely, that the authors of IDKR claim
that their reading of Religion is unique because it is holistic and linear
(171–174). The word linear appears only once in IDKR, and it is not there
identified as a uniqueness (IDKR, 233). To the contrary, our treatment of
the secondary literature in Part 1 presents alternative readings in as linear
a manner as possible. The uniqueness of our position consists in (a) some
of our preliminary considerations, (b) key features of our interpretation
that emerge in response to the conundrums, and (c) the ability of our read
to answer the conundrums.
The next three Errors of Fact all center on IDKR’s treatment of the two
experiments. They are: (i) the authors do not consider alternatives to their reading of the two experiments, (ii) the authors provide no rationale for their reading
of the two experiments, and (iii) the authors do not address Kant’s use of scripture
as potential counter-evidence to their reading of the two experiments (175–176).
To (i), we do consider the reading of Hare and Reardon, which presumes
that the first experiment consists of Groundwork and the second Critique
(IDKR, 69–82, 114–119). This read has a commonsense appeal to it, since
these works present Kant’s moral philosophy, and as we show in IDKR,
this reading is able to handle a number of conundrums (IDKR, 73–82).
However, coming to Error of Fact (ii), we note several reasons for preferring our reading of the two experiments over the reading of Hare and
Reardon. First, Kant indicates in Book 4 that he is now turning to New
Testament (NT) Christianity, and is going to test it to see what in it falls to
the realm of reason. This talk of turning to NT Christianity indicates that
he has not previously done so in the manner of Book 4, and the nature
of this turn fits what he describes in the Second Preface of Religion as his
second experiment. Second, Kant’s terminology for the Christ figure of
Religion shifts in Book 4. In Books 2 and 3, Kant consistently refers to the
tra: we do not claim that all other interpreters truncate the Religion text, only that we do
not do so when defending its coherence (IDKR, 234). (iii) The authors accuse others of making
the text appear more persuasive than it actually is (178). Ad contra: I know of no place in IDKR
in which we claim that other Kant interpreters are guilty of making the text appear more
persuasive than it actually is. (iv) The authors take Kant’s “metaphorical pruning” to apply only
to Christianity, not to any other historical faith (176). Ad contra: we make quite clear that Kant’s
“metaphorical pruning” could be applied to any historical faith, even though Kant chooses
to make focus on NT Christianity in Religion (IDKR, 197–201). (v) We portray Palmquist as advocating mystical irrationality (see his footnote 8). Ad contra: we distinguish the Critical Mysticism discussed by Palmquist from the uncritical mysticism of Swedenborg (IDKR, 21–24).
I have excluded instances of Begging the Question. E.g., Palmquist presents our conclusion
that Kant’s prototype is Platonic rather than Christian as a strike against us (179), which
begs the question of whether we are correct. I have also excluded an instance of Internal
Contradiction. To wit: Palmquist at one moment attacks IDKR’s reading of the two experiments because the relationship between rational religion and historical faith, addressed in
Book 3, belongs to the second experiment (contra IDKR) (176); and later Palmquist argues
that the relationship between rational religion and historical faith, addressed in Book 4,
belongs to the first experiment (contra IDKR) (177).
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prototype, while in Book 4 he refers to Jesus as the Teacher of the Gospel. This
sharp distinction gives reason to think that Kant’s talk of the prototype
in Books 2 and 3 is different from his discussion of Jesus in Book 4. Third,
Kant is clear that rational faith in the prototype is distinct from historical
faith in a particular historical figure. In this light, any reading that conflates his discussion of the prototype in Books 2 and 3 with a discussion
of Jesus is misguided. Kant’s turn to the Teacher of the Gospel in Book
4 should therefore be read as distinct from his prior discussion (IDKR,
114–119).
To Error of Fact (iii), we address Kant’s use of scripture directly prior to
moving into our reading. I will simply quote the key passage on the point:
Three points should be kept in mind. . . . First and foremost, Kant is explicit
in the claim that the philosophical faculty is free to draw on any resources
it likes, even the Bible, in its critical evaluation of reason, but such drawing
does not mean that the use is dependent upon these resources. . . . Second,
Kant also gives indication in the First Preface of Religion that he intends
Religion to be (at least partly) in dialogue with theologians. . . . A third point
to consider is that we find in Book Four of Religion Kant’s affirmation of the
claim that revelation, which cannot be viewed as impossible, could present
itself as a catalyst for awakening truths already embedded in reason. . . .
Such statements indicate that Kant is not adverse to the idea that an insight
(a rational insight) may be awoken by engagement with a purported revelation. (IDKR, 117–118)

These three Errors of Fact appear in the context of one claim that is true:
we do not consider Palmquist’s reading of the two experiments (175–176).
The reasons for this have already been noted by Firestone. In Palmquist’s
published works, the main evidence for his reading is his broader system
of Kant interpretation—a system we do not endorse. In addition, IDKR is a
problem-driven project, and we did not find in Palmquist either acknowledgement of or dealings with the conundrums in Kant’s Religion. As for
the “massive” textual evidence Palmquist forwards in his paper, once one
cuts through the fallacious claims catalogued therein, the case amounts
to an observation that Kant quotes scripture prior to Book 4.14 As noted
above, we address this point in IDKR, and I believe our exposition makes
clear that what Kant is doing with Christianity in Book 4 is different from
what he does in Books 1–3.
3.2. Direct Attacks
A second prominent maneuver invoked in Palmquist’s criticism is the
Direct Attack in which he makes an unsupported assertion. The majority,
though not the totality, of these appear in Palmquist’s attack on IDKR’s
reading of the two experiments. The first three state in different ways that
14
A serious problem for Palmquist’s reading is that Kant quotes Scripture unpredictably
throughout each book of Religion. If biblical quotations constitute evidence of the second
experiment, I would conclude that Religion contains only the second experiment, as per the
Hare/Reardon reading.
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Book 4 adds something crucial to the first experiment. Palmquist asserts
that Kant says something essential about the first experiment in Book 4,
but he does not tell us what this something is (177). The closest he comes
to defending the claim is another Direct Attack in which he asserts that
the distinction between true and false service to God is a “crucial component of Kant’s system of rational religion” (177). Is it? Palmquist does not
defend the claim, and I do not know any reason to accept it. He only goes
on to restate the point again, suggesting that answering the question of
how one serves God in a Church is crucial to the first experiment (177).
But again, the point is asserted, not defended.
The fourth instance of Direct Attack focuses once again on IDKR’s reading of the two experiments, but takes aim at a different target than the
above three instances. As mentioned, IDKR argues that Kant’s turn to NT
Christianity to test it is one of several reasons to think the second experiment begins in Book 4. Palmquist asserts that Kant’s word “test” (prüfen)
carries a distinctive meaning that is irrelevant to the two experiments; the
term for experiment (Versuch) used in the Second Preface does not appear
in Book 4 (see footnote 12 of Palmquist’s essay). Yet, Palmquist does not
say what the distinctive meaning of prüfen is or why it is irrelevant to the
two experiments. Is it true that Versuch (experiment or trial) has a technical meaning wholly unrelated to prüfen (to test or examine)? It is not clear
to me that the meaning of these terms are unrelated or that either is so
technical that Kant is bound to invoke the given word and only that word
when discussing the particular aspect of his project to which it refers.
There is a fifth instance of Direct Attack in Palmquist’s critique that
does not focus on the two experiments. This instance aims at dismissing
IDKR’s reading of Book 3. In our exposition thereof, we make the case
that Kant understands the morally converted individual to be fine in isolation, but easily corrupted when in community with other individuals
who have not undergone a moral conversion; therefore moral converts
must band together in moral community (IDKR, 185–192). Contra IDKR,
Palmquist claims that converted individuals corrupt one another (179).
But once again, Palmquist provides no evidence for this counter reading.
3.3. Arguments by Half Truth
I find two fairly significant instances of Argument by Half Truth in
Palmquist’s paper, both of which center once again on IDKR’s understanding of the two experiments. The first is Palmquist’s claim, “IDKR
repeatedly identifies the second experiment with the entire Fourth Piece,
yet admits the turn to the second experiment actually occurs only after
Kant makes this distinction in the introductory section” (178). It is certainly true that the authors of IDKR suggest that Books 1–3 contain the
first experiment, while Book 4 contains the second experiment (e.g., IDKR,
119). But I know of no place where we put so fine a point on it as to say
that the entire Book 4 is the second experiment. We maintain that the first
experiment resolves with Book 3, but we understand Kant to open Book 4
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with a preliminary word on the relationship between reason and revelation (IDKR, 211–220). I do not understand why this is problematic. Kant
has just spoken about rational religion, and is about to scrutinize a supposed revelation (Christianity) in light of rational religion. Prior to doing
so, he addresses a dispute in his day concerning the precise relationship
between reason and revelation (IDKR, 214–220). Given that he is turning
from the one (reason) to the other (revelation), such a preliminary word
seems appropriate. I see no reason to think that simply because Book 4
contains the second experiment, the first word of the book must constitute
the execution of that experiment. Kant cannot offer a preliminary word?
The second example of Argument by Half Truth concerns Palmquist’s
claim:
In describing Kant’s account of the two experiments, they claim the first
“considers only natural religion,” while the second relates natural religion
to a specific revelation; yet Kant introduces “natural religion” only in the
Fourth Piece, never mentioning it in the Prefaces. By assuming the first experiment corresponds to what Kant later calls “natural religion,” they cleverly make their assumption appear self-evident: the Fourth Piece, being the
only place where Religion discusses how natural religion as such relates to a
purported revelation, must constitute the second experiment! (175)

The half truth here concerns the definition of natural religion. It is true
that we take “natural religion” to mean a religion based on reason. As
Kant states, “a religion can be natural . . . if it is so constituted that human
beings could and ought to have arrived at it on their own through the mere
use of their own reason” (6:155). We thus understand “natural religion”
and the “pure religion of reason” (identified in the Second Preface) to refer
to the same thing. But the falsehood is that this is clever. To the contrary,
it is common. Allen Wood, for example, understands these terms in the
same way.15 Palmquist’s resistance to this reading implies that he thinks
“natural religion” and the “pure religion of reason” are distinct, which
makes me wonder how he understands these terms. If there is something
clever afoot here, it is the divorce of these terms, not their marriage.
3.4. Poisoning the Well
The last of Palmquist’s tactics I will address is the Poisoning of the Well.
There are numerous instances of this throughout Palmquist’s paper, particularly in his portrayal of what the authors of IDKR are doing at various
stages (e.g., we rationalize [176]; we are forced to downplay [177]; we systematically
overlook [179]). However, I will focus on one much more serious example.
Palmquist suggests in several places that IDKR advances a reading of Religion very similar to his own, but does not acknowledge it (173). We advance
a view of atonement similar to Palmquist’s own, but do not acknowledge it
(174). We take him out of context and then assert his true position (see his
15
See Allen W. Wood, “Kant’s Deism,” in Kant’s Philosophy of Religion Reconsidered, ed.
Philip J. Rossi and Michael Wreen (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1991), 5.
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footnote 9). Kant’s Critical Religion directly influenced IDKR’s understanding
of the first experiment, but we do not acknowledge it (174).
In reply, I would note some of the most central insights that set IDKR
apart as unique. In IDKR, we suggest that the first of Kant’s two experiments occupy Books 1–3, while the second experiment is in Book 4. We
follow Kant’s arguments in Book 1 to the conclusion that humanity, in the
sense of secondary substance, must possess freedom in at least one act,
namely, the defining of its supreme moral maxim; and it is this monopsychic fall that constitutes radical evil. We unearth indications in Book 2
that Kant’s prototype is essentially a Platonic archetype in God. We show
how Kant understands the prototype to provide hope by making his disposition available to corrupt humanity, and we expound how union with
the prototype’s disposition in conversion puts away the guilt of our former disposition and unites us with a disposition pleasing to God. We expound the relationship between moral conversion and the need for moral
community, discussed in Book 3. We exposit the peculiar weaknesses of
corrupt humans and why an engagement with historical faith is required.
Our exposition of Kant’s preliminary word in Book 4 sheds new light on
precisely how Kant understands the relationship between the naturalist,
rationalist, supernaturalist and pure rationalist. And our reading systematically expounds and seeks to put away all the conundrums noted in the
secondary literature.
I know of no place in Palmquist’s writings in which any of the above
features or insights, as expounded in IDKR, can be found. Quite the contrary, I understand us to hold vastly different positions on virtually every
key point of interpretation of Religion.
4. Reply to Gordon Michalson
I begin my reply to Michalson by addressing four minor points: (a) his
concern that IDKR bars “hostile” witnesses, (b) his fear that the courtroom metaphor of IDKR distorts the readings of Religion addressed, (c) his
claim that his own work is not concerned with the argumentative specifics of Religion, and (d) his misunderstanding of key interpretive moments
in IDKR.
Michalson is concerned that IDKR bars hostile witnesses, such as
Yirmiahu Yovel, from the courtroom (191). For Michalson, this sets off
alarm bells. It would for me, too, if this meant that opposing voices were
not allowed when looking at the specifics of Religion. Yet, in the context
of IDKR, this is not what is meant by the phrase. Certainly Wolterstorff
and Quinn are hostile in a certain sense. To wit: they are hostile to the
coherence of Religion.16 Such witnesses we have not only invited into
16
We focus on the following works in IDKR: Nicholas Wolterstorff, “Conundrums in
Kant’s Rational Religion,” in Rossi and Wreen, Kant’s Philosophy of Religion Reconsidered;
Nicholas Wolterstorff, “Is It Possible and Desirable for Theologians to Recover from Kant?,”
Modern Theology 14:1 (1998); Philip L. Quinn, “Christian Atonement and Kantian Justification,” Faith and Philosophy 3:4 (1986); Philip L. Quinn, “Original Sin, Radical Evil and Moral
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IDKR, but have given our unwavering attention (IDKR, 46–57). Those witnesses barred (which actually amounts to one) are readers who are hostile
to the idea that Religion has something substantial to say. To admit these
witnesses amid such a project would simply be unproductive, since they
have no interest in such a project. To be sure, dismissing these readers
does not ensure the coherence of Religion, as Michalson claims. For all
apparent conundrums internal to the text and interpretive options forwarded in the literature are given ample hearing (IDKR, 46–57; chap. 3).
The limited number of voices merely assures that time is not wasted on
arguments external to Religion that do not advance our understanding of
the text itself—the primary concern of IDKR.
A second issue is Michalson’s fear that the courtroom metaphor used
in IDKR distorts the readings of Religion addressed. Michalson is right
in noting that guiding metaphors can warp interpretations (184)—as can
meta-narratives regarding Kant’s place in Western thought. But the courtroom metaphor in IDKR is simply a literary device meant to help readers
navigate material that is detailed and difficult. Because our concern is the
question of coherence—nothing more, nothing less—those who argue for
the coherence of Religion are deemed “defenders”; those who argue for
incoherence are dubbed “prosecutors.” Defenders and prosecutors are
so named relative to the coherence issue, not relative to the question of
Kant’s significance. Many whom we lump with the prosecution are, to our
minds, devoted Kantians—certainly more so than the authors of IDKR.
Michalson’s proclamation that he is a defender of Kant’s significance (183)
is simply off topic. IDKR is not concerned with this. Regarding the question at hand—coherence—I do not believe warping has taken place. For
Michalson admits his position is that Religion displays wobbles (188), or in
the words of Fallen Freedom, is “riddled with inconsistencies.”17
This brings us to a third issue, namely, whether Michalson’s interest
in Western thought generally adequately glosses over the specifics of
Religion. Michalson sees his work as showing Kant’s importance to contemporary thought (183). The authors of IDKR do not dispute this. We
may not even dispute the nature of Kant’s impact. What we do dispute
is (a) that the story of Western thought can be told accurately without addressing the textual specifics of its players, and (b) that focus on the story
of Western thought provides license to run roughshod over Kant’s texts.
For an important question is whether the theologically negative impact
Kant has had on Western thought matches his actual views. In light of
our exegesis in IDKR, we question whether the religiously negative perception of Kant is accurate. Michalson may want to divert attention away
from his treatment of the specifics of Religion by deferring to his broader
Identity,” Faith and Philosophy 1:2 (1984); Philip L. Quinn, “Saving Faith from Kant’s Remarkable Antinomy,” Faith and Philosophy 7:4 (1990).
17
Gordon E. Michalson, Jr., Fallen Freedom: Kant on Radical Evil and Moral Regeneration
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 1–10.
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aims, but the fact remains that the plot of the story changes depending on
whether the impact a thinker has had is true to his writings. In the end,
Michalson cannot shield his exegesis by appeal to a broader interest.
Fourth, I think it is noteworthy that while Michalson’s essay does not
address the specifics of IDKR, his rare references to its specifics display
misunderstandings of key interpretive moments. For example, Michalson
states, “In a creative move, they fold together the issue of moral conversion and the themes of atonement and grace running through the authors’
depiction in the previous chapter of Jesus as the ‘prototype’ of a moral disposition totally pleasing to God” (186; see also 187). As discussed above,
central to the argument of IDKR is the claim that Kant’s discussion of
the prototype in Book 2 is not about Jesus. In fact, our entire reading of the
prototype is placed in juxtaposition with readings, such as Michalson’s
own, that make this conflation (IDKR, 155).18 This causes me to wonder
if Michalson’s interest in the motive of IDKR has caused him to miss the
argument of the book.
The aforementioned interest in the motive behind IDKR is what I will
devote the remainder of this essay to addressing. According to Michalson,
the exposition of primary and secondary literature in IDKR is elaborate
scaffolding that obscures the more interesting aim of showing Kant to be
compatible with Christianity. In this charge, there are really two claims:
(a) IDKR’s treatment of primary and secondary literature is disingenuous, offering cover for a more central agenda, and (b) the authors of IDKR
think Kant and Christianity are compatible. I will deal with these issues
separately, beginning with the former.
Michalson could not be more wrong in stating that the exposition of the
secondary literature (Part 1) and the exposition of Kant’s Religion (Part 2)
are mere scaffolding. IDKR unfolds under a very intentional methodology.
In Part 1, we treat the status quaestionis regarding Religion. We do so using
a courtroom metaphor that helps readers differentiate advocates of coherence from opponents of coherence. The result is a tally of charges against
the coherence of Religion, and an accounting of hermeneutic options in
the literature. Part 2 exposits Religion in light of Part 1. We follow Kant’s
arguments in a linear and expository manner until a conundrum (identified in Part 1) is confronted. Hermeneutic forks in the road are identified
by drawing on existing readings (again, as per Part 1), while also noting
options not yet tested. Each road is put in dialog with the conundrum at
hand, and whichever road can best deal with the conundrum is taken. The
entire project is driven by the twofold query: What are the hurdles to reading
Kant’s Religion as coherent? Can these hurdles be overcome? The above method is employed consistently throughout IDKR with a view to answering
this twofold query.
Now we come to the second feature of Michalson’s charge, namely, that
the authors of IDKR think Kant and Christianity are compatible. I must
E.g., Michalson, Fallen Freedom, 109.
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thank Michalson for providing an opportunity for me to set the record
straight on this. Though I am a theologian by trade, I set aside my theologian’s hat in IDKR to wear my historian of ideas hat. Allow me to put back
on my theologian’s hat and speak transparently about my take on Kant’s
philosophy of religion. I do not think Kant’s “rational religion” is compatible with orthodox Christian thought.
Michalson drew on an isolated statement from page 5 of IDKR in
which we note that, at points, Kant’s Religion begins to look remarkably
Christian. This comment, taken out of context, could give the impression
that there is a positive assessment of Kant’s value for Christian thought.
However, in context, the remark is intended to state clearly that we are
not interested in whether Kant’s philosophy is compatible with Christian
thought, nor are we assessing the value of Kant’s philosophy of religion
from a Christian perspective. The theological value of Kant is a question
we do not explore in IDKR, and we are explicit about that fact (IDKR, 5–6).
Our affirmation that aspects of his thought look remarkably Christian is
simply an acknowledgment that, on our reading, Kant’s philosophy advocates universal moral corruption; Kant notes the need for an alternative disposition that he locates in a moral archetype who sounds like a
Christ figure; and Kant identifies the value of a moral community not
unlike a Church. Indeed, these elements look very Christian. But looks can
be deceiving.
The more important remark regarding my own assessment of Kant’s
value for Christian thought comes in the context of our exegesis of the
prototypical theology. We state that Kant’s prototype is divine “in the
sense that he exists within God from all eternity,” but not in the NiceneChalcedonian sense (IDKR, 163). Speaking as a confessional Christian, I
think this assessment is par for the course in Kant’s philosophy of religion. Assuming IDKR is correct, Kant’s conclusions are more theologically robust than typically thought and come much closer to the central
claims of Christianity than is often granted, but Kant’s most theologically
robust moments are still at some remove from orthodox Christianity, at
best falling short of its confessional standards and at worst proving incompatible with these standards. I certainly find Kant’s arguments interesting on several points. But on all major points at which Kant’s project
overlaps with Christian doctrine—depravity (Book 1), Christology (Book
2), and ecclesiology (Book 3)—I think his positions prove to be theologically inadequate and often heterodox.
Kant’s argument for radical evil (as expounded in IDKR) is interesting,
but I am unconvinced that it works. Kant believes the predicate moral indicates that human entails a freely chosen moral maxim concerning the
moral law generally; hence it is an essential property of our secondary
substance (human) that it (i.e., our common nature) freely chooses a moral
disposition that is then innate in all particulars having that nature. Such a
view has a striking similarity to the monopsychism Christian orthodoxy
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has historically resisted.19 I, for one, side with the Patristic outlook that
predicates such as good or evil are accidental properties in creatures.20 While
I concede that it is essential to the very idea human that we have moral faculties, I do not concede Kant’s claim that being a moral species entails monopsychism. The inference from the predicate moral to moral maxim regarding
the moral law in general presumes Kant’s moral philosophy (IDKR, 127–151).
If one is in lockstep with Kant, this may follow. But I am not. Hence Kant’s
argument for radical evil falls stillborn from where I sit.
Kant’s Christology, as mentioned above, has precedence in the Kabbalist notion of Adam Kadmon and other NeoPlatonic versions of Judaism,
such as Philo of Alexandria’s Heavenly Man.21 I think it is likely that these
NeoPlatonic versions of Judaism are precisely what sit in the background
of Kant’s thought, since these were already employed in Kant’s day as a
way of evangelizing Jews without appeal to the NT or the historical Jesus.22
However, I think such Christology offers an inadequately low standard of
divinity. Granting the reading of IDKR, Kant’s prototype is not a second
divine particular (hypostasis) having the same essence (ousia) as God the
Father. Rather, the prototype is divine in the same way that any Platonic
Idea emanating from the mind of God in eternity is divine. It is divine by
virtue of being in God (6:60, cf. 28:1058–1059). On this reading of Christological divinity, I cannot see how such a divine-human archetype is any
different than, say, the divine-canine archetype of a dog that is in God’s
mind from eternity. Kant could reply that he has no rational basis for believing that God has an archetypal Idea of dog; he only has a rational basis
for believing in God’s Idea of our moral prototype. But this only delays the
issue. If God does have Ideas other than the human prototype, those Ideas
are just as divine as the Son of God, or to invert it, Kant’s prototype is no
E.g. monopsychism was targeted in the Condemnations of 1270.
See, e.g., Origen, De principiis, 1.5.3; 1.8.3 (PG 11:158–160; 178–179); Gregory of Nyssa,
Oratio catechetica magna, 8; 21 (PG 45:33a–40b; 57a–60b); and John of Damascus, De fide orthodoxa, 2.27 (PG 94:960b–961a). Patristic citations refer to standardized divisions and their
locations in Patrologiae cursus completes, ed. J. P. Migne (Paris, 1844–1866).
21
Gershom Scholem, On the Kabbalah and Its Symbolism (New York: Schocken, 1965), 159–
165; Philo of Alexandria, Legum allegoriae, I, xii (31); and Samuel Sandmel, Philo’s Place in
Judaism (New York: Ktav, 1971), xxi, 100.
22
Allison P. Coudert, “The Kabbala Denudata: Converting Jews or Seducing Christians,”
in Jewish Christians and Christian Jews: from the Renaissance to the Enlightenment, ed. Richard H. Popkin and Gordon M. Weiner (Kluwer Academic Publishers), 79–80; Sarah Hutton,
Anne Conway: A Woman Philosopher (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 123;
Sheila A. Spector, “Wonders Divine”: The Development of Blake’s Kabbalistic Myth (Lewisburg,
PA: Bucknell University Press, 2002), 32; Allison P. Coudert, “Isaac Luria and the Lurianic
Kabbalah,” in The Columbia History of Western Philosophy, ed. Richard H. Popkin (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1999), 214–215. For Leibniz’s comments on Adam Kadmon, see
“Leibniz to Maturinus Veyssière la Croze (Berlin, 2 December 1706)” in Opera Omnia, ed.
Ludovic Dutens, vol. 5, 479–484; “Leibniz to Thomas Burnet, 26 May 1706” in Correspondance de Leibniz ave l’Electrice Sophie de Brunswick-Lunebourg, ed. O. Klopp (London: William
& Norgate, 1874), vol. 3, 217; Die philosophischen Schriften von Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, ed.
C. I. Gerhardt, 7 vols. (Berlin, 1875–1890), vi, 112–113; Maria Rosa Antognazza, Leibniz on
the Trinity and the Incarnation: Reason and Revelation in the Seventeenth Century, trans. Gerald
Parks (Yale University Press, 2008), 140–143.
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more divine than those Ideas. Surely this is not the Christ of Chalcedon or
of history.
As for Kant’s ecclesiology, it finds practical footing, but this footing
is far different than that of the one Holy Catholic and Apostolic Church.
For Kant, the gathering of moral converts is mere utility, providing support in the battle against moral regress (IDKR, 185–192). The collection of
converts is ad hoc, built on nothing but a common moral struggle. I understand the Christian Church to be something far different. The Church is
an organism that is mystically united with Christ as his body. Its existence
is grounded not in utility, but in the Incarnation. This event marks the
moment at which the life that is in God the Father—a life given by eternal
generation to God the Son—descended to humanity, communicating that
life to our dying species. That life was breathed into the apostles at Pentecost, given to the clergy, and is distributed to all who are willing to receive
it by means of the sacraments. Through this organism, the immortal life
of God spreads throughout the world and throughout time. The Church
is not a club whose value resides in group support; its value resides in its
sacramental power to commune its members with the life-giving flesh
and blood of Christ, and the life of God found therein.
All of the above points, however, come down to a fundamental difference between the respective starting points for Kant and me. Kant begins with epistemic strictures that pose serious difficulties for theological
knowledge and discourse. I believe Kant’s strictures are in many ways
correct, as is his understanding of the problems these strictures pose.
In my assessment, the Eastern Church fathers shared these very same
strictures. The great difference concerns not the limits of human reason
but the way forward. Kant establishes the limits of human reason; he
presumes these limits to be stable; and from within these limits he seeks
a rational theology. Yet, the Church fathers grant the same limits concerning both God and things in themselves.23 Unlike Kant, however, they take
our faculties to be mutable and susceptible to transfiguration, and such
metamorphosis is the very promise of the sacramental life and the goal
of mystical pursuit.24
For my part, I think Kant does a remarkable job of offering arguments
that press in the direction of a great many truths. But Kant’s arguments,
23
I have in mind here the patristic distinction between ousia and energia, according to
which the essence of a thing is never accessible to our faculties, since we only ever interact with appearances and operations. See, e.g., Irenaeus, Contra haereses, 4.20.5–11 (PG
7:1034–1041); Origen, De principiis, 1.1.5–6; 1.1.9 (PG 11:124–126; 129–130); Basil of Caesarea,
Epistolae, 233.1–2; 234.1–2; 235.1–2 (PG 32:264b–268b; 268b–272b; 872b–873a); and Gregory of
Nazianzen, Orationes, 27–28 (PG 36:12b–72b).
24
See Irenaeus, Contra haereses, 4.20.5–11 (PG 7:1034–1041); Athenagoras, Legatio pro Christianis, 9 (PG 6:905a–908b); Basil of Caesarea, De Spiritu sancto, 9.23 (PG 32:109a); Epistolae, 236
(PG 32:876b–885a); and Gregory of Nazianzen, Orationes, 27–28 (PG 36:12b–72b). I argue this
point in “What Hath Königsberg to Do with Byzantium? An Eastern Reply to the Problem
of Post-Kantian Theology,” 45th International Congress of Medieval Studies, May 13–16, 2010,
Kalamazoo, MI.
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in my assessment, distort these truths. The end result is more a testimony
to the ingenuity of the human mind than a fount of knowledge. To be
sure, I am not saying that Kant’s arguments should not be considered on
their own merits. Yet, my assessment is that the results are so distinctly
Kantian that even if the arguments prove valid, as IDKR argues, they are
bound to die the death of a thousand qualifications that none other than
Kant himself would grant.
John Brown University

